Expeditionary Warrior 2013
Senior Leader Outbrief

6 June 2013

Wargaming Division
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
# Senior Leader Outbrief Agenda

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Opening Remarks

LtGen Richard P. Mills
Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration
BGen Mark “Notso” Wise
Commanding General, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
Director, Futures Directorate
The Military Problem ...

Diverse and multiple threats that demand unique capacity and better awareness

Resource constrained – we can only afford one force

Our current scale and capacity precludes flexible response to address diverse, but very capable threats

Constraints on maritime forces’ scale in organization of forces and platforms
Identify concepts, capabilities and capacity solutions required by the Marine Corps and Navy to provide forward presence, yet rapidly build forces for crisis response, for future maritime operations in 2035.

Who: 120 participants from across all five Services, Joint Staff and OSD Representatives from 13 partner nations and industry
What: EW13 Main Event
Where: The Mason Inn Conference Center and Hotel, George Mason University
When: 25 February to 1 March 2013
Implications for Joint and Naval Force

Future Maritime Operations and EW13

EW13 was primarily informed by ideas offered in a draft Future Maritime Operations concept paper outlining an approach to seabased operations that:

- Emphasizes existing regional networks and relationships to gain awareness that provides context about the operating environment
- Leverages / integrates forward deployed forces with other maritime, interagency, joint and partner forces to provide options for proactive, early, preventive actions
- Provides agile, scalable, task-organized forces to respond to the threat or crisis, including major combat
**Assumptions**

- “Pacific Pivot”
- Plausible, but distinctly different, future
- Forces based on current trajectories in programming and resourcing
- Diminished federal budget; resource constraints
Scenario

2035 Asia - Pacific Theater

- US Forces have realigned
- The Koreas have unified
  - Nuclear power
  - No longer US ally
  - No significant US permanent basing
- Chinese aggressiveness is rising
- Taiwan is peacefully resolved
- Russia and Japan are reassertive
- Japan-US new G70G reduces US forces
- India’s regional presence is growing
- Arctic is open to limited resource extraction and shipping – supporting infrastructure is increasing
- Regional economies are surging
- 35 nations plus territories
- 4 most populous countries: China, India, US, Karta
- 4 US treaty allies: Australia, Japan, Philippines, and Thailand
- 6 of the world’s 10 largest armies: China, India, Russia, Korea, US, and Vietnam
- 45% of global trade
- 50% of global GDP
- 60% of all US exported goods
- 1,100 languages

2035 Realignment and US Basing

- No US Forces in Korea following reunification
- Limited basing in Japan – new 30DA

Kingdom of Karta

- Government: Monarchy (Absolute)
- Population: ~214,000,000
- Economy: 9th largest global economy (GDP: ~$2.5 trillion)
- Capital: Jakarta
- Financial Center: Kuala Lumpur
- Robust infrastructure
- Long-time US partner
- Pragmatic relationships with regional powers
- Aspirations for more regional influence
- Karta Armed Forces (KAF)
  - Moderately sized, high-end defense force
  - Royal Karta Navy, Royal Karta Marines, Royal Karta Air Force, Royal Army of Karta and Royal Karta Special Forces
  - Mission: Defend Karta’s sovereignty and international interests
  - Capabilities: High-end, sophisticated military

2035 US Maritime Forces Command

(MARITIMEOF PAC)

- Combined Marine and Navy component
- Replaces Marine Forces Pacific and Pacific Command
- Maritime Operations Centers are Marine integrated
- III MEF strength increased with forces from I and II MEF
EW13 Observations and Insights
Observation: Expanded use of individual and small units in theater security cooperation (TSC) engagements can provide the maritime force better situational awareness, and potentially enable senior political and military leaders with options for proactive, preventive and early actions in emerging crises. Risks of early engagement must be considered.

Key Points

- Embedded and rotational presence forces
- Awareness and context
- Regionalization at regimental level
- Special operations and conventional forces integration
- Force protection remains a concern
Observation: The ability to rapidly aggregate and disaggregate forces in a crisis requires agile, adaptive command arrangements. ... Aggregation of US maritime and joint forces with partner forces create interoperability challenges.

Key Points
- Institutional, organizational, cultural and procedural barriers
- Forward deployment of embedded/enduring presence forces is a must
Topic: Single Naval Battle and Littoral Maneuver

**Observation:** Single Naval Battle and littoral maneuver are not well developed or understood. Establishing a co-located, integrated Navy-Marine Corps maritime operational staff appears to be a useful first step for the conduct of a coherent naval campaign.

**Key Points**
- Combined USN-USMC operational Maritime Operations Center in Guam
- Rapidly changing task organizations and command relationships
- Joint aggregation protocol may facilitate in-stride aggregation at onset of crisis
- One cell did not establish subordinate unit boundaries in order to focus task groups on tasks – not battlespace
Topic: SOF-led Aggregation/Disaggregation and Operational/Support Implications

Key Points

- Regional SOF coordination center → C2 aggregation/disaggregation
  - Organized from forward-deployed forces
  - Intent-based/adaptive organizations for rapid aggregation
- SOF C2 capabilities and limitations in support of naval campaign
- Need to examine potential C2 TSOC and JTF relationships/implications
Observation: C2 processes, mechanisms and capabilities for “integration of U.S. maritime, joint, interagency, and partner nations” ... represent a significant challenge and will require further development in order to link current and future command relationships and architectures to desired future requirements.

Key Points
– Complexities and challenges associated with interoperability and coordination
– Automation and human-technology interface issues
– Need or willingness to use cloud-based tools for information exchange
**Observation**: The future maritime force requires **multiple, diverse platforms** to enable **operational maneuver from the sea** and **provide tactical mobility once ashore**. A robust A2/AD environment will likely stress the ability to insert forces through aerial platforms. The use of **distributed, flexible, low-signature small boats and surface connectors** may facilitate operational and tactical littoral maneuver.

**Key Points**
- Littoral maneuver requirements → watercraft, amphibious vehicles, ground vehicles; when, why and how to expose to risk
- Non-traditional platforms, depending on the threat environment
- Faster, low-signature boats and versatile surface connectors
- Deck-space management tradeoffs
- Need exist for cheap, internally transportable vehicles for organic ground mobility
Observations:

- Kinetic and non-kinetic fires → risk mitigation
- Manned and unmanned systems, loitering munitions and over-the-horizon platforms
- Cyber authorities → complexity and potential for friction grow as operation grows; optimal positioning of cyber operators
- Airspace C2 deconfliction challenges at multiple echelons of command within contested or semi-permissive airspace
- Short response time required for campaign compelled players to streamline CFACC / Air Operations Center functions for CJTF
Observation: Sustainment of distributed maritime forces will require the logistics system to be flexible and capable of access to redundant sources of supply. Future efforts should examine sustainment for FMO forces in more detail and explore options to improve naval logistics integration.

Key Points

– “Dedicated” logistics may constrain flexibility
– Reliance on sources outside Marine Corps for theater-level sustainment
– Selective prepositioning
– Size, scope and character of forward bases and enabling sites
– Potential use of unmanned systems
– Trade-off between type, numbers, employment and distribution of sustainment platforms
EW13
Recommendations
Command and Control

• Explore non-traditional command arrangements including use of a regional Maritime Operations Center to exercise JTF operational control
  – Marine Corps forces that fall under operational control of a SOF command acting as JTF HQ
• Conduct a detailed excursion that explores the command and control challenges faced when attempting to aggregate forces in-stride for crisis response
• Deployable JTF-capable HQs and MCWL’s Fly-in Command Element (FICE) initiative
• Assess the manning impacts of an integrated Navy and Marine Corps maritime component operational staff
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

- **Alternative tools and processes to manage and facilitate information sharing**
- **Man, train and equip to improve conventional forces’ capabilities to solicit and analyze information, then distill and disseminate intelligence to provide operational context**
- **Ongoing DOD-level C2 working groups to study information sharing options across a multinational force**
  - Tiered access for CENTRIX/SIPRNET
- **Cloud-based information/intelligence networks**
- **Link existing ISR capabilities with future ISR platforms**
Maneuver

• With the Navy, examine the tradeoffs between capital ships and high-speed, low-signature platforms
• Use the Naval Services Game 2013 (NSG13) to wargame alternate methods to employ a distributed, forward-deployed MEU
• Joint aggregation protocol
• Mobility implications in a high-end A2/AD environment
• Integration of unmanned aerial capabilities into assault support
• Examine options to preserve critical but high-demand capabilities to transition forces ashore such as Assault Craft Units, Beach Groups and NECC assets (e.g., SeaBees, RIVRON)
• Explore the feasibility of affordable, internally transportable vehicles to provide ground forces with organic mobility
Fires (Kinetic and Non-Kinetic)

- Kinetic and non-kinetic fire support procedures featuring enemies, friendlies and neutrals in a small area
- Re-assess naval surface fire support requirements for next generation naval ships within an FMO context
- Human dimension considerations and challenges associated with fires approval/deconfliction in complex, dynamic environments
Sustainment

• Naval Logistics Integration (NLI) effort:
  – SPMAGTF security cooperation and crisis response missions
  – Naval sustainment in the littorals
  – Logistics Combat Element / Aviation Combat Element lessons learned
  – Marine Corps inventory → Combat Logistics Force inventory

• Ship-to-shore *throughput* capacity

• *Austere basing* within A2/AD environment
Force Protection

- Ships and unmanned undersea systems that minimize their exposure to A2/AD threats
- Ballistic missile defense for forward naval bases and enabling sites
- Unmanned systems and their role in force protection
Gold Cell Comments

ADM Walter Doran, USN (Ret)
LtGen Wallace “Chip” Gregson, USMC (Ret)


Conclusion

• Declining budget environment is the new reality and will shape how we will do business within the U.S. military for years to come.

• Future studies and experiments must connect today’s capabilities with those planned for the future in order to meet future operational requirements.

• The general conclusions pulled from EW13 game play must be translated into hard data that utilize modeling and simulation, as well as force development planning.
Way Ahead

If all or parts of FMO are worthy of further pursuit, here are five recommendations for consideration:

1. Make a concerted effort to increase Marine presence on Naval shipping in order to enhance forward-deployed forces’ operational capabilities.

2. Prototype a Naval – Navy and Marine Corps – operational staff using the MOC, FICE and other initiatives in order to optimize blue-green C2 integration.

3. Leverage past practices to regionalize commands at the regimental level in order to build institutional awareness of geographic areas of instability.

4. Further develop concepts that should be institutionalized as part of FMO.

5. During EW14, further explore FMO concepts and capabilities, and their applicability to joint concepts (e.g., JOAC, JCEO, ASB, etc.).
Closing Remarks

Gen James Amos
Commandant of the Marine Corps
QUESTIONS?
BACKUP SLIDES
Key Personnel

Cell A
Lead: Col Scott Aiken, USMC, USFFC
Fac: Mr. Jim Trahan, SVG
Analyst: Mr. J.D. Canty, CETO
Planner: LtCol Ford Phillips, Ellis Grp

Cell B
Lead: CAPT Thomas Negus, USN, ESG-2
Fac: Mr. Wes Hammond, CD&I
Analyst: Mr. John Berry, CD&I Concepts
Planners: LtCol John Adams and Mr. Doug King, Ellis Grp

Cell C
Lead: LTCOL Simon Bonavita, Aus Army
Fac: Mr. Doug Stilwell, ONR-30
Analyst: LtCol Mike Chambers, SIG
Planner: Maj Rod McHaty, Ellis Grp

• Gold Cell Members
  – ADM Walter Doran, USN (Ret), CDR PACFLT, CDR 7th Fleet
  – LtGen Chip Gregson, USMC (Ret), Asst SecDef for Asian-Pacific Affairs, COMMARFORPAC
  – LtGen Duane Theissen, USMC (Ret), COMMARFORPAC, CG III MEF

Marine Corps Wargaming
Game Director: Dr William Lademan
Deputy Game Director: Col Tom Connally
Lead AO: Maj Jody White
Embedded Forces:
- Live, train & operate w/HNSF
- Build awareness, detect growing instability
- Totally sustained via local husbanding arrangements
- Normally OPCON to US Country Team, but may be returned to theater component command if necessary
- Examples: In-theater SOF, some naval forces

Enduring Presence Forces:
- Via GFS or regional sub-stations, naval forces conduct TSC in a given region
- From these forward-deployed bases, naval forces would make visits of varying frequency and duration – depending on threat level

Cruising Forces:
- Operate globally and are chopped to naval component commander
- Positioned for either maritime security ops or deterrence
- Task-organized and controlled from MOC
- May conduct TSC in conjunction with embedded or enduring presence forces
- Mitigates force protection risks to which embedded and enduring presence forces may be exposed

Total Fleet:
- Organized into home surge and sustaining force, scalable adaptive forces, and forward forces
- Home surge/sustaining force: Provides for homeland security; mans, trains and equips for rapid aggregation if necessary
- Personnel, equipment and sustainment coded by readiness/capability to be able to deploy scalable adaptive forces to form a maritime task force

FORCES AVAILABLE FOR MARITIME TASK FORCE

Cruising Forces

Enduring Presence Forces

Embedded Forces

Total Fleet

FORCES AVAILABLE FOR MARITIME TASK FORCE
Expeditionary Warrior Series

• Title 10 wargame conducted annually by Wargaming Division, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
• Provides Commandant of the Marine Corps with venue to address key issues relating to the future of the Corps
• Past topics:
  – 2008-2010: Seabasing
  – 2011: Joint Operational Access Concept/Enhanced MAGTF Operations
  – 2012: A2/AD Challenges
FMO: The Central Idea

To win the “come as you are fight” requires awareness, early action and agility through scale to quickly aggregate a tailored force.

• Appropriate force for proactive/preventive action enabled by awareness
• Organized from forward-deployed forces mitigating tyranny of distance
• Intent-based/adaptive organizations enabling rapid aggregation
• Agility through scalability
• Seamless global integration of U.S., maritime, interagency, joint and partner nation capabilities
• Littoral maneuver: blue to green to brown to objectives ashore
• Dedicated logistics enables flexible response of aggregated forces
• Readily available kinetic and non-kinetic fires, mitigating risk of smaller forces
• Dedicated mobility enabling tactical and operational maneuver in multiple mediums
EW13 Analysis Methodology

- Discussion and planning activities were documented by recorders and analysts within each of the three player cells.
- Facilitated discussion on fourth day of wargame enabled each cell to discuss attributes/challenges associated with tenets within FMO concept paper.
- Post-game analysis workshop conducted on week following Main Event to assess data and observations; session was enabled by computer-assisted program from HQMC/ARHM
  - Participants: CD&I Concepts Branch, HQMC SIG, CETO and Wargaming Division
  - Data analyzed by players’ planning response and implications of response on concepts, capabilities and capacities
  - Impacts on warfighting functions
  - Impact on selective military missions highlighted in *CCJO: JF2020*
MCWL Campaign Plan

February 2013: EW13 “Establish the Concept”

Winter 2014: EW14 “Develop the Force Structure”

Winter 2015: EW15 “Operationalize the Concept”

FMO Wargaming

Develop Solutions to Capability Gaps
Analyze solutions
Refined FMO Concept

FY 13
FY 14
FY 15
FY 16
FY 17
FY 18

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FMO Experimentation

Tech Development Timeline
Wargaming Way Ahead

• Naval Services Game 2013
  – Focus: Alternate methods to employ distributed, forward-deployed ARG/MEU
  – 7-11 October 2013, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.

• EW14
  – Focus: Establish FMO’s baseline capabilities
  – Projected Main Event date: February 2014

• EW15
  – Focus: Operationalize FMO concept
  – Projected Main Event date: February 2015
• **Theme:** Seabasing

• **Purpose:** Examine seabasing concept in the context of foreign internal defense (FID) and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.
  – Identified and assessed capabilities required for FID and COIN operations supported by Seabasing.

• **Observations**
  – Seabased forces provide the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with options to meet the challenges of FID-COIN operations supporting distributed forces in vast geographic areas of operation.
  – Seabasing can provide options and flexibility in the face of challenges to access that will continue to impede joint and combined operations in the future.
  – In a FID-COIN environment, seabasing is an enabler to the Ambassador and country team.
• **Theme:** Seabasing

• **Purpose:**
  – Refine seabasing solutions to address gaps in policy and interoperability in the use of the seabase as an operational enabler.
  – Generate insights into required seabased capabilities and capacities that can inform programmatic and doctrinal efforts.
  – Identify key issues that specifically require seabasing experimentation and exercises to validate.

• **Observations**
  – Overcoming access-denial has given way to the need for seabasing support to the more likely scenarios such as TSC, FHA/DR, NEO and STABOPS.
  – Seabasing is evolving to become more about operating concepts than it is about hardware or ships.
  – Not an all-or-nothing proposition; growing recognition of the need for balance between land- and seabased ops.
**Theme:** Joint Operational Access Concept and Enhanced MAGTF Operations

**Purpose:**

- **JOAC:** Examine the central idea and operational methodology for countering anti-access military challenges contained in the JOAC, and the Marine Corps’ role as an expeditionary force in readiness in this environment.
- **EMO:** Explore notional operating parameters in order to inform development of EMO; assess ability of 2024 MEU to support; and establish a baseline scenario to support EMO experimentation plan.

**JOAC Observations**

- Increase engagement by the MAGTF in shaping the battlespace.
- Maritime mine threat will continue to have significant impact; partner nation assets may be required to address.
- Overcoming A2/AD capabilities using combat power could be time and combat power intensive.
- Air Force can complement MAGTF ops using kinetic/non-kinetic fires and full-spectrum ISR support.

**EMO Observations**

- Examine capability of USMC/USN C2 organizations and ability to facilitate seabased extended range operations.
- Integration of USMC/SOF operations.
Theme: Overcoming A2/AD Challenges

Purpose: Explore operational challenges, potential shortfalls and naval integration opportunities for JOAC, Air-Sea Battle and conceptual initiatives resulting from Amphibious Capabilities Working Group.

Observations

– Need to reconcile USN and USMC operational doctrines in order to achieve coherence needed for joint operational access and the conduct of Single Naval Battle.

– Aggregation of myriad capabilities, battlespace organization and command relationships in a dynamic A2/AD environment require further exploration.

– Interoperability challenges exist between the Navy, Marine Corps and SOF. COMRELS among Marine forces, naval component commanders and SOF commanders must be clarified.

– Interoperability challenges – USMC, USN and SOF.

– Airspace C2 and joint effects integration need further study.

– Information sharing.

– Capacity shortfalls: Surface connectors, support personnel and lift.

– Uncertainty regarding cyber capabilities and authorities.
Observation: Airspace command and control of manned and unmanned systems, coupled with the likely need for deconfliction with surveillance platforms as well as long-range and loitering munitions, will likely challenge the future joint and maritime force. These challenges will be particularly acute when attempting to synchronize operations at multiple echelons of command within contested or semi-permissive airspace.

Key Points

– Given the extremely short response time required, players were compelled to streamline coordination with the CFACC to exercise theater-level C2.
– Players stressed that the Air Operations Center did not necessarily need to be in the JOA to support the campaign.
– Within FMO campaign, there was confusion about local control of aircraft.
– Airspace management issues within EW13 could highlight doctrinal gaps defining responsibilities over littorals, airspace, blue water and land.
– The use of surface fires (naval/ground) will complicate deconfliction efforts.
Observation: Players examined the role of cyber authorities in the context of early action, the interrelationship between cyber and information operations and the impacts on cyber authorities, and the use of embedded and forward deployed cyber forces. In general, players stated that cyber activities will become more complex within the context of an FMO approach that utilizes early action to address a budding crisis.

Key Points

– Potential friction with other interagency activities
– Complexity grows as operation grows
– Players debated on degree and level of cyber capabilities forward deployed with JTF.